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Will the "Bang" Mean "Big" Changes to
Japanese Financial Laws?
By Jessica C. Wiley*
I. Introduction
On November 11, 1996 Japan's then-Prime Minister, Ryutaro
Hashimoto, proposed a fundamental shift of Japanese economic pol-
icy that should result in the deregulation of Japan's financial sector!
Following British and U.S. examples, the Japanese economy is
headed for a "Big Bang."2 In the financial arena, Big Bang is the
term associated with London's 1986 deregulation measures that
brought about large-scale reorganization to the financial sector as
well as led to the recovery of London's international status as an eco-
nomic power.3 Japan hopes its own version of the Big Bang widll do
the same for its market.4
Since the early 1990s, Japan's economy has suffered the effects
of a bubble economy and deteriorating international positioning.
* Member, Class of 1999. B.A., University of California at San Diego, 1996.
The author would like to thank Professors Dan Henderson and William Dodge for
their suggestions on this Note. This Note would not have been possible without the
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1. Japan's Reforms, FIN. Twrs (London), Nov. 12, 1996, at 19.
2. Panel Eyes Full Deregulation of Forex Services, JAPAN VKLY. MO1ITOR, DeC.
23, 1996, available in 1996 WL 13936403. For a description of the economic princi-
ples behind the Big Bang, see Ann Seidman & Robert B. Seidman, Drafting Legisla-
tion for Development" Lessons from a Chinese Project, 44 AM. J. COMP. L 1, 34-36
(1996).
3. Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, The Plan for a Japanese Big Bang (last modified Feb.
15, 1997) <http://wwv.dkb.co.jpfenglishfmarketleconomic199702J9702-3e.html>.
Some commentators argue that the Big Bang is not deregulation but re-regulation.
See STEVEN K. VOGEL, FREER MARKETS, MORE RULES: REGULTORY REFORM IN
ADVANCED INDUSTIAL COUNTRIEs 3 (1996).
4. But see Edward J. Park, Comment, Allowing Japanese Banks to Engage in
Securitization: Potential Benefits, Regulatory Obstacles, and Theories for Reform, 17
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 723, 752 (1996); Robert B. Seidman et al., Big Bangs and
Decision-Making: What Went Wrong?, 13 B.U. INT'L LJ. 435 (1995).
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Hashimoto actively promoted deregulation to prevent the yen and
the Japanese economy in general from being left out of a new global
financial order, dominated by the U.S. dollar and the Euro, the new
European Union currency!
The essence of Japan's Big Bang is the end of highly segmented
financial markets in favor of a single market where domestic and for-
eign banks, securities houses, insurance companies and other finan-
cial institutions will be totally free to compete in each other's busi-
ness specialties. These economic changes will be spurred by legal
reforms. The hope is that these legal reforms will solidify Japan's
dominance by allowing it to compete with the emerging markets in
Singapore and Hong Kong as well as the established dominant mar-
kets of London and New York.7
One of the first reforms that went into effect was changes to the
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, which allow indi-
viduals and companies to handle foreign currencies more freely.' The
changes became operative in April 1998 and effectively liberalize
foreign currency settlements in place of yen settlements.' This revi-
sion is regarded as the engine behind the rest of the deregulation
package and was prompted by fears that an outflow of financial assets
of individuals and companies may be triggered by other legal and fi-
nancial changes unless regulations are sufficiently relaxed."
However, the question must be asked: will these legal reforms
termed "deregulation" truly be a liberalization that opens up Japa-
nese financial markets? The Japanese are known for one hundred
percent liberalizations of their financial markets; there have been
more than four.1 In order for Hashimoto's proposals to result in ef-
5. Anthony Rowley, Tokyo Plans Big Bang with 2001 Target Date, Bus. TIMES
(Singapore), Nov. 12, 1996, available in 1996 WL 6289173; Ministry of Finance, Fi-
nancial System Reform: Toward the Early Achievement of Reform (last modified June
13, 1997) <http:llwww.mof.go.jp/englishlbig-banglebb32.html>.
6. See Rowley, supra note 5.
7. Japan Banking on Change: Loosening Financial Regulations Could Aid
Competitiveness, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 21, 1997, at B5 [hereinafter Japan Banking on
Change].
8. Revision of Foreign Exchange Law Wins Diet Approval, JAPAN WKLY.
MONITOR, May 19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8246509.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Reforms termed "liberalizations" occurred in 1967, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1973
and 1980. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., History of Legal Restrictions on Direct In-
vestment in Japan, in DIREcr FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN JAPAN: THE CHALLENGE FOR
FOREIGN FIRMs A7, A7-A12 (1987). See Brian Arthur Pomper, Note, The Japanese
[Vol. 22:379
1999] Will the "Bang" Mean "Big" Changes to Japanese Financial Lay;s? PS1
fective economic liberalization, however, the government bureauc-
racy must remove itself from the marketplace and more fundamen-
tally away from its deep business interests.
Part II of this article discusses the economic and political woes of
the current Japanese situation. It provides background for the causes
of the economic crisis in Japan. Part Ill introduces the concept of the
Big Bang, using the experiences in the United States and London to
establish the necessary elements for successful deregulation. The sec-
tion focuses on the recent Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law
(FEFTL) changes as an example of Japanese Big Bang legislation.
Part IV analyzes whether these FEFTL changes vill be successful in
bolstering a full-scale deregulation, and more generally if they will
help save the failing Japanese economy. In particular, the section
discusses institutional impediments to the success of the changes and
prospects for the future. Part V concludes that it is in the best eco-
nomic interest of Japan to support the FEFTL and other Big Bang
reforms regardless of the short-term harm it will bring.
II. The Setting
Some commentators note that "Japan's financial system [is] at a
juncture today which is not comparable to any other episode during
the past 45 years." The conflict between the financial system and
regulatory structure has put tremendous stress on the financial sys-
tem.'3 After World War II, Japan's economy grew faster than that of
any other advanced country."4 By the 1980s, trade deficits with coun-
tries like the United States drove the Group of Five to encourage or-
derly appreciation of main non-dollar currencies against the dollar
through the so-called Plaza Agreement." This agreement resulted in
a fifty-three percent devaluation of the dollar against the yen be-
tween February 1985 and January 1988." The rise of the yen led to
lower interest rates as regulation decreased to offset the economic
Financial Reform of 1993: Will Reform Spark Innovation?. 28 COM4ELL INT'L LJ.
525 (1995).
12. Thomas Cargill et al., Japanese Deregulation: What You Should Kno:w (last
modified June 22, 1997) <http:'lwvww.nmjc.orgijiapfdereg[paper-!deregconfhutch
ison.html>.
13. Id.
14. EDWARD F. DENISON & WILLIAM K. CHUNG, How JAPAN's EcoNO.n1y GREw
So FAST. THE SouRcEs OF PoSrWAR EXPANSION 46-54 (1976).
15. Kazuhide Uekusa, The Making and Breaking of a Bubble Economy, JAPAN
EcHo, Winter 1991, at 23,23-25 (1991).
16. Id.
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slowdown produced by the appreciation. As interest rates fell, stock
and land prices surged, and the money supply grew. 8 In late 1986 or
1987, this asset inflation process appeared to become a speculative
bubble with little restraint either from financial institutions or regula-
tory authorities.1 9
A. The Bubble
Japan permitted the expansion of credit out of fear that re-
straining the flow of Japanese funds to the United States, which de-
pended on such funds to cover its current account deficit, might trig-
ger a stock market crash.' Low interest rates coupled with easy
credit encouraged individuals and firms to borrow money.1 The cen-
ter of the problem was the banks that helped drive up real estate
prices by making generous loans to speculators. When the economy
slowed and inflated property values fell, the banks were left with bad
loan portfolios that tightened their financial status.3 The government
chose to support the banks and their bad loans.24 Instead of deflating
the bubble, the government bailout freed up loans and simply al-
lowed banks to dole out more improper loans. This inflated the bub-
ble even more.
The extent of the problem was not apparent until the burst of the
bubble economy in late 1990 and 1991.2 The deflation of the bubble
and asset price decline occurred because of a combination of policy
actions and the self-correcting mechanism of the speculative proc-
ess.26 Out of concern about asset price inflation, the regulatory agen-
cies raised interest rates while the Ministry of Finance (MOF) slowed
land price rises.' Once asset prices declined, banks had incentive to
reduce lending for real estate and other purposes."1 As prices
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Cargill, supra note 12.
20. See Uekusa, supra note 15.
21. Miho Yoshikawa, Many Japanese Can't Handle Credit Cards, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Jan. 24,1993, at L9.
22. Tokyo Housing Prices Finally Come Down but Credit Crunch Keeps Lid on




26. Cargill, supra note 12, at 4.
27. Id.
28. Id. Until the late 1980s, corporate institutions remained dependent on bank
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dropped, the self-correcting mechanism inherent in the speculative
process activated itself, and expectations of further price declines
generated selling which in turn led to price declines. "
By the early 1990s, asset deflation dramatically affected the
profitability of Japanese financial institutions, which then cast doubt
over the stability of the entire financial system.' Once the bubble
burst, a prolonged recession followed." By 1995, the stock market
lost half of its value from a 1989 peak, a loss of about $2.5 trillion.'
To compound the problem, MOF, the primary regulatory agency, re-
acted slowly to the growing non-performing loan problem confront-
ing financial institutions."
B. The Regulatory Response
The first official response to the economic crisis was a series of
specific uncoordinated actions predicated on a short recession and
rapid recovery of prices.' These responses had little impact on the
downward trend in asset prices and deterioration of the financial sys-
tem. 5 Fortunately, they were followed with more specific and ag-
gressive actions. For example, the government established the Coop-
erative Credit Purchasing Company (CPCC) in late 1992 to provide
accelerated tax benefits to large banks without requiring the banks to
loans instead of direct issuances of securities. While an increasing number of corpo-
rate institutions took advantage of access to international markets to diversify their
finance sources over the last fifteen years, individual households remained undiversi-
fled in their asset selection and suffered greatly from the decline. See Ernest T. Pa-
trikis, Essay, Japan's Big Bang Financial Reforns, 24 BROOK . I INT'L L. 577, SSO-81
(1998).
29. Cargill, supra note 12, at 4.
30. Id.
31. Even in 1995, the stock market was still seen as overvalued. For example, in
1995, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank was trading at 174 times earnings. By contrast, U.S.
banks were trading at about ten times earnings (i.e. investors pay S10 for every S1 in
annual profits). James K. Glassman, Down and Out in Japan, WASH. PosT, Sept. 12,
1995, at A19.
32. Martin C. Evans, Despite Questions About Government Response, Private
Response Is Good News for Japan's Economy, and California's, ORANGE COUN Y
REG., Feb. 19, 1995, at K1. In 1991, banks accounted for nearly twenty-five percent
of total Japanese stock market capitalization. By 1998, bank shares were only six-
teen percent of the total market. More than any other sector, bank shares have
brought down the Nikkei. Jathon Sapsford & Sara Webb, Tokyo Market's Current
Slogan: We Are No. 3, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1998, at Cl, C16.
33. See Cargill, supra note 12.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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directly write off losses and acknowledge them in public reports."
Unfortunately, sales of the CCPC loans were minima[ and there is
concern that there will not be enough funds to repay the interest on
the loans. 7
In 1995, the MOF actually closed some of the lowest-quality in-
stitutions by allowing massive write-offs and infusing public funds to
cover the costs of closing financial institutions specializing in housing
loans.' This action demonstrated a recognition by buceaucrats that
bursting the bubble was more important in the long run than sus-
taining all businesses. However, the response was late and incom-
plete, and the economic condition continued to worsen. In fact,
"government efforts to reinvigorate the economy in the 1990s
[caused] the public debt to swell to somewhere around 80% of the
GDP by early 1998.""3 The government's response prior to the intro-
duction of the Big Bang reforms only postponed the "inevitable
reckoning with the country's bad debt."4
C. International Pressures
The international forces driving Japan to deregulate are as im-
portant as the domestic forces pushing Japan to reform." Many
countries and intergovernmental organizations believe that Japan's
current restrictive market is violative of the internalional norm.42
They are "increasingly worried that Japan's accumulated financial
and economic problems are pushing it to the brink of a depression,
one replete with deflation, bank runs and tremendous unemploy-
ment."43 Several of Japan's largest trading partners want access to
the Japanese market-access that Japan always promised but never
delivered. Japan attempted to internationalize early on, by means of
membership in organizations like the International Monetary Fund,




39. Economy: Economic Policy, COUNTRY PROFILE: JAPAN 1998/1999, July 23,
1998, at P7, available in 1998 WL 19896176.
40. Id.; see Japan's Late Awakening, FIN. TWMES (London), Sept. 9, 1995, at 6.
41. See generally Japan: Review 1998, ASIA & PAC. REV. WORLD INFO., Nov. 1,
1998, at 1.
42. Keikichi Honda, Why Japan's Big Bang Is Necessary, JAPAN UPDATE, July
1997, at 8.
43. David P. Hamilton, State of Denial: Japan's Economy Is in Trouble, but
Don't Tell That to Tokyo, WALL ST. J., June 17,1998, at Al.
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for Economic Co-operation and Development. However, the Japa-
nese government was reluctant to pay the price of such memberships,
i.e. external economic liberalizations, which implied a threat to do-
mestic controls as well."
While entrance through the back door seemed opportunistic at
the time, in the end, it may be the downfall of Japan's international
status. While the rest of the developed world deregulated its finan-
cial industries, Japan's reluctance to give up domestic control means
it is now out of step with every other major financial market." Its in-
dustrial standards in areas ranging from construction to transporta-
tion are outside international norms." Japanese standards for prod-
uct safety, health requirements, inspection requirements and
government approval processes are more stringent than those in most
other industrialized countries and act as a de facto barrier to many
exporters wishing to do business in Japan.'
In fact, along with many foreign companies that stopped trading
their shares on the Tokyo Stock Exchange because of the high costs
associated with such activity, Japanese investors increasingly buy
stock in Japanese companies in London, where transaction fees are
lower." The international concern of the Ministry of Finance is that
as Europe approaches a unified currency, the yen has yet to become
established as the currency of preference in its major trading areas."
Regionally, Japan faces challenges from the markets of Hong
Kong and Singapore, which would both like to become Asia's main
financial hub.50 Nonetheless, foreign markets are pushing Japan to
open up because they see the estimated $10 trillion in combined fi-
44. LEON HOLLERMAN, JAPAN DISINCORFORATED: THE ECONOMIC
LIBERALIZATION PROCESs 123 (1988).
45. "While it has been mired in red tape, the world's two other big financial cen-
tres, London and New York, have roared ahead." A Big Bang for Japan: The Japa-
nese Government Has Announced Its Intention to Reform the Financial System.
Should Proposals Be Taken Seriously?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 1996, available in 1996
WL 1124712.
46. Gillian Tett, Japan Unveils Next Stage in Its Policy 'Striptease', FiN. TI .Es
(London), Nov. 18, 1997, at S.
47. Thomas R. Hurst, Book Review, Japanese International Trade and Investment
Law, 13 Hous. J. INT'L L. 389, 403 (1991) (citing NIHON KEIz4 i SiMBUN, Jan. 4,
1982, at 7).
48. Cameron W. Barr, Japan Promises a "Big Bang;" but Some Say It Could Fiz-
zle: Deregulation Seen as Key to Competitiveness of Financial Industry, CHRIST LN
Sci. MOnrOR, Nov. 18, 1996, at 9.
49. Richard Hanson, Strike One to Japan's Finance Ministry, ASIA Ti.MEs, June
16,1997, at 1.
50. See Barr, supra note 48.
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nancial assets held by Japanese individuals as a potential gold mine. 1
Some regional leaders also blame the continuing Asiar. financial cri-
sis on Japan's slow response to its poor economic sit uation."2 The
plain conclusion is that Japan's rigid regulation of its domestic finan-
cial markets made it uncompetitive with the world's other major fi-
nancial centers and created financial institutions that depend more on
official protection than the ability to succeed amidst free competi-
tion.'
D. Other Domestic Concerns
Finally, there is a domestic sense that the high level of regulation
makes Japan's industries less able to compete in a globalized econ-
omy.' Japan's demise as an international market center would have
worse domestic ramifications than the current bad loan crisis. If Ja-
pan's international status notably declines, the ability of the govern-
ment and big companies to pay pensions and provide health care and
other social services to the aging populace will be jeopardized."
Nevertheless, the Japanese economy has its strengths. Its debt to
gross domestic product level on Maastricht criteria56 is about twenty
percent against sixty percent for the European centers' In addition,
there is recognition that Japan has the money to be an international
financial center." Until these shortcomings are fixed, financial trans-
51. Foreign Banks Restore Interest in Tokyo Market, ASIA PULS- , July 23, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 11803050.
52. See Hamilton, supra note 43.
53. See Hanson, supra note 49.
54. See Barr, supra note 48.
55. Id.
56. The Maastricht criteria are the economic convergence criteria that must be
met by European Union Member States in order to participate in the Euro. Clifford
Chance, European Monetary Union: The Legal Framework, 1086 PRAC. L.
INST./CoRP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 405, 452 (1998) For a descrip-
tion of the criteria, see Dr. Fridrich E.F. Hey, Euro Currency Will Come with a Big
Bang: German Tax and Accounting Consequences, 8 J. INT'L TAX'N 396, 402-03
(1997) (Exhibit 3).
57. Patrick Weever, City: The Sinking Samurai Yamaichi Has Collapsed and
Many Other Japanese Financial Institutions Are Tottering on the Brink. Patrick
Weever Examines the Depth of the Country's Crisis and the Corruption Behind It,
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 30,1997, at 6.
58. Japan's Big Bang: Interview: Masamoto Yashiro, Rep. in Japan of Citibank,
N.A. Big Bang Reforms Needed in Japan: Without Reform, Tokyo Will Be Unable to
Compete Against New York and London as an International Financial Center, ASAHI
SHiMBUN, July 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11414258 [hereinafter Asahi Shimbun
Interview].
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actions that otherwise would be expected to take place in the Tokyo
market will be conducted elsewhere." Furthermore, various indus-
tries may become less competitive due to the inability to obtain nec-
essary financial services, and Japan's influence in the international
arena will be undermined.0
I. The Big Bang
A. Goals of Reform
The ultimate goal of any Japanese financial reform is improve-
ment in the overall performance of its financial markets. Using the
British and U.S. examples, Japan hopes similar reforms will improve
its international status. The lesson from the British is that market de-
regulation has to proceed boldly, regardless of the short-term pain."
Also, new unambiguous rules must be devised to replace old, convo-
luted regulations as well as administrative guidance.2 Like Japan,
deregulation for both the United States and Britain was necessary for
survival in the changing institutional and international economic en-
vironment of national financial markets.
B. Deregulation in New York and London
The main difference between deregulation in the United States
and Britain rests in the catalyst for reform. In the United States, the
impetus was the institutionalization of the market, the increasing im-
portance of financial institutions as opposed to individuals as partici-
pants. In Britain, the internationalization of the markets drove re-
form.' In Britain and the United States, the Big Bang reforms
accomplished their principal purposes of substantially reducing insti-
tutional investors' transaction costs and maintaining their respective
positions as major international financial centers."
59. Id
60. Id.
61. Juichi Yamanaka, A New Image of Japanese Finance: Big Bang to Deliver
Power to Consumers (visited Mar. 31, 1999) <http://%A w.serv.neti-japanus
/anewimag.html>.
62. Id. For discussion of the practice of administrative guidance, see text infra
Part IV.E.l.a.
63. NORmAN S. POSER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION: LoNDCA'S
"BIG BANG" AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS 17 (1991).
64. Id. at 28.
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1. United States
The process of deregulating the world's financial markets began
in the United States in 1975 and took several years to complete.'f In
1963, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Silver v. New York Stock Ex-
change that a stock exchange may be subject to antitrust laws.( Al-
though Silver did not specifically address exchange rule;, it was clear
that rules regulating commission rates and restrictions on member-
ship would not satisfy antitrust laws.67 Thus, Silver furnished the legal
impetus for change in the United States.'
There was also economic pressure for reform. The growing eco-
nomic power of institutional investors had the effect of undermining
the fixed commission structure on the exchange.69 In response, on
May 1, 1975, dubbed Mayday, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) prohibited fixed commissions on all customers' trades.70
A month later, Congress enacted the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975 that ratified the SEC action and further provided that any quali-
fied broker-dealer firm was entitled to stock exchange membership.7
Mayday's primary effect was to significantly reduce income from
the commission on securities transactions. It was the demands of in-
stitutional investors that drove commission revenues from their high
of $3.163 billion to $2.809 billion in a twelve-month period.' At the
same time, costs rose rapidly, reaching $6.314 billion in 1977.7' Thus,
Mayday depressed profits on Wall Street, which fell from $915 mil-
lion in 1971 to $188 million in 1977.' 4 As income from commissions
fell and competition intensified, Wall Street responded with "crea-
tivity and innovation in designing and marketing nontraditional
products and services ... to create new sources of revenue beyond
65. Lawrence A. Rand, Crisis Management from a Public Relations Point of
View, 793 PRAC. L. INsT./CoRP. L. & PRAc. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 759, 794
(1992).
66. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
67. POSER, supra note 63, at 15.
68. Id.
69. Id. Between 1960 and 1971, the average size of mutual fund orders on the
New York Stock Exchange increased from 550 to 4,206 shares. Securities Industry
Study: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong. 65 (1973).
70. Norman Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's
National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883, 901 (1981).
71. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1999).
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simple common stock, straight preferred and long bonds."'5 Fur-
thermore, money managers became more aggressive in getting the
highest rate of total return on investments." Even though U.S. de-
regulation was a success, the rest of the world did not immediately
follow U.S. lead towards deregulation. Britain was the next major
economic power to deregulate in a Big Bang fashion eleven years
later. However, since 1986, deregulation has occurred at a faster
pace throughout the stock markets of the world.'
2. Britain
Like the U.S. reform, British deregulation took place over sev-
eral years. While the term Big Bang is typically used to refer only to
the important changes in the London Stock Exchange's (LSE) rules
and procedures that occurred on October 27, 1986, some of the major
changes in the London market occurred well before this time.' 3 Also,
like the U.S. experience, it was a series of financial, economic and le-
gal pressures that created the impetus for deregulation." The legal
catalyst was a lawsuit brought against the LSE by the Director of Fair
Trading in 1977 pursuant to his charge as head of the Office of Fair
Trading, the government agency responsible for enforcing the Re-
strictive Practices Act of 1976 (RPA)" ' The suit charged that the ex-
change's fixed commission rates and membership restrictions were
illegal under the RPA.I In July 1983, an agreement was made and
the lawsuit terminated under which the exchange was exempted from
the RPA.n The LSE, for its part, agreed to open up membership,
abolish fixed commissions and allow company representatives and
75. Id. at 790.
76. Id. at 792.
77. POSER, supra note 63, at 17. The following countries deregulated in response
to London's 1986 reforms: France in 19S9, the Netherlands and Sweden in 1990,
Switzerland, Italy and Germany in 1991 and Spain 1992. Norman Poser, Automation
of Securities Markets and the European Conuznity's Proposed Investment Services
Directive, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 29, 32-33 (1992). The Big Bang reforms
throughout Europe provided unprecedented access to its capital markets. See Man-
ning Gilbert Warren M, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achieve-
ments of the European Conmunities, 31 HARV. IN 'L LJ. 185, ISS (1990).
78. POSER, supra note 63, at 27. Fixed commissions on transactions in foreign
securities were scrapped in 1984, brokers were permitted to act as dealers in foreign
securities under certain conditions in 1984, and the disassembly of membership re-
strictions began as early as 1969 and were completed in March 1986. Id.
79. Id.'at 25.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 26.
82. Id.
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public members on its governing council.'
For firms whose activities were deregulated, London's Big Bang
created competitive pressures that cut profit margins and led to sub-
stantial operating losses for some.' On the other hand, the Big Bang
stimulated competition among firms, increased efficiency and liquid-
ity of the market, reduced costs for investors and enhanced the inter-
national role of the London securities market." It also provided the
incentive for a screen-based trading system. 6 While Britain is no
longer one of the most important economic powers, London has re-
tained its status as a major financial center, as a place where many
transactions take place, in many ways because of its Big Bang.
C. Elements of the Big Bang
The sweeping changes initiated by the LSE in 1986 embody the
three principal elements of Big Bang deregulation. Japan's Big Bang
is more extensive, however, and it will produce changes not only in
the securities market but in the financial, economic and fiscal sys-
tems.' Nevertheless, the British Big Bang remains a useful compari-
son because the two reform packages are based on similar princi-
ples.'
First, the membership structure of the LSE changed, giving ac-
cess to domestic and foreign investment banks as well as commercial
banks.' Before deregulation, membership was restricted and under
the control of the LSE governing body.' The need for capital pro-
vided the incentive to open up membership." While member firms
were first permitted to obtain capital from non-members in 1969, it
was not until the Big Bang that a single non-member shareholder
could own one hundred percent of the voting power of a member
firm.' This change reflected the perception that the market needed
additional capital, especially foreign capital, to participate in large-
83. Id.
84. Id. at 74.
85. Id. at 74-75.
86. Id. at 75.
87. See Japan: Review 1998, supra note 41.
88. See generally Patrick M. Creaven, Note, Inside Outside Leave Me Alone:
Domestic and EC-Motivated Reform in the UK Securities Industry, 60 FoRDHAM L.
REv. S285 (1992).
89. POSER, supra note 63, at 28.
90. Id. at 12.
91. Id. at 30.
92. Id. at 31.
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scale institutional trading.' Permitting non-members to own member
firms brought the capital sought by the LSE, and it also brought some
important players into the international equity markets. '
Second, the Big Bang eliminated fixed commissions allowing
London to remain competitive with foreign markets that already had
a system of negotiated commissions."s Before deregulation, the LSE
set the commissions customers paid to their brokers. ' The primary
purpose of the fixed commission was to make sure customers were
charged at least a minimum amount established by the rate sched-
ule.' As the securities market became more complex, so did the rate
schedules.' The elimination of fixed commissions in gilt-edged secu-
rities and equities was implemented as a condition of the settlement
agreement in the RPA lawsuit brought by the Director of Fair Trad-
ing against the LSE.' However, the LSE went further than the set-
tlement required and lifted all fixed commissions because of the pres-
sure placed on it by the Bank of England, its informal regulator and
advisor." As the central bank, the Bank of England would have no
difficuity disciplining the LSE and members if its advice was re-
fused.10'
Replacing fixed commission rates with competitive rates bene-
fited the increasing number of institutional investors who saw a re-
duction in their commission costs, but it harmed the individual inves-
tor who actually saw an increase in commission charges."'2' In part,
higher commissions on the smaller transactions of individual inves-
tors was a result of the LSE failure to reduce the costs of clearing and
settling transactions."3 The heavy emphasis on transferring pieces of
paper to clear and settle a sale resulted in an inefficient clearing pro-
93. Id.
94. Id. at 32.
95. Id. at 28; see also Aulana Peters, The Changing Structure of the Financial
Services Industry and the Implications for International Securities Regulation, 46
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 525 (1989).
96. POSER, supra note 63, at 13.
97. Id.
98. Id. London had four different schedules: gilt-edged securities, debentures
and bonds, shares other than U.S. or Canadian companies and shares of U.S. or Ca-
nadian companies. In addition, brokers had discretion to reduce the commission rate
by specified amounts under certain circumstances and for certain tpes of orders. Id.
99. Id. at 26.
100. Id. at 29.
101. Id. at 30.
102. Id. at 55.
103. Id.
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cess that took two weeks to complete."°' Its replacement, an elec-
tronic three-day system, which eliminated stock certificates and pa-
perwork, did not arrive until 1994."
Third, the Big Bang brought fundamental changes to securities
trading, changes that were designed to create a more efficient and
fairer market for investors."° The elimination of fixed commissions
required the LSE to revise its system for trading securities. The revi-
sions resulted in two major changes to the LSE: the abolition of sin-
gle capacity restrictions and a computerized quotation system.",
The single capacity restrictions required every investment firm
to choose whether it wished to act as an agent for customers or as a
dealer (jobber) for its own account. 8 The single capacity system was
seen as preventing London from becoming a center for the trading of
international securities. Although it avoided the conflicts of interest
inherent in firms that act in multiple capacities, it prevented diversifi-
cation and the acquisition of capital.'o
The computerized quotation system replaced the traditional
"open-outcry" trading system.10 The new system allowed market-
makers to show their quotations and offers to buy or sell on a com-
puter screen that could be seen by any person who wi3hed to sub-
scribe.' The system was chosen primarily because it furthered the
LSE goal of becoming a center for international trading. Its main ad-
vantage is that it does not depend on the geographical location of the
members using it." Both the abolition of the single-capacity system
and the move to an automated quotation system created a more effi-
cient and productive London financial market.
The three elements are closely related. The elimination of fixed
commissions made the single-capacity system unworkable. Negoti-
ated commissions meant increased competition for business, and in-
creased competition for business meant the desire to diversify skills
and abilities to attract business, and that made the single-capacity
104. Id. at 58-59.
105. Id. at 63.
106. Id. at 28.
107. Poser, supra note 77, at 31.
108. Id.
109. Poser, supra note 70, at 38.
110. See Sam Scott Miller, Regulating Financial Services in the United Kingdom:
An American Perspective, 44 Bus. LAWv. 323,326 (1989).
111. Poser, supra note 77, at 31.
112. Poser, supra note 70, at 42.
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system unworkable.l The ability to engage in dual capacities made it
necessary to modify the trading system. The changes made to the
trading system to service the growing number of institutional cus-
tomers increased the need for capital, and the need for capital neces-
sitated changes in the LSE membership rules.' Taken as a whole,
these changes made it possible for London to compete in the world
securities market.
IV. Japan's Plan
According to Hashimoto, the goal of Japan's Big Bang is to revi-
talize the Tokyo market into a financial market comparable to those
of New York and London by the year 2001.'" In order to accomplish
that goal, the Big Bang simultaneously promotes market reforms and
bad loan disposal by financial institutions."' Japan's plan rests on
three principles: free, fair and global.'17 "Free" meaning toward a
free market where the market mechanism prevails; "fair" meaning
toward a transparent and credible market; "global" meaning toward a
leading international market."'3
Japan believes the reforms must benefit the "users" of the finan-
cial market. Thus, the goals underlying each change are the follow-
ing: expanding the choice of means for investors and borrowers, im-
proving the quality of services and promoting competition among
securities firms, developing a market vith more depth and establish-
ing a reliable statutory framework as well as a fair and transparent
market.'9 These principles, goals and the Big Bang in general repre-
sent a movement towards reliance on market mechanisms.' The
market accounts for the free and fair principles making the Japanese
market more attractive to foreign investors and satisfying the final
"global" principle. One of the hallmarks of the market system is its
demand for efficiency. The Japanese market after the Big Bang wiU
be stable when it reaches efficiency, and that will require the disposal
of non-performing assets and freedom from government regulation.
113. Id. at 37.
114. Id. at 28.
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Hashimoto's proposals amount to the most significant changes in
the Japanese financial system since the U.S. Occupation after World
War HI." His proposals include scrapping fixed brokerage commis-
sions on stock trades of more than fifty million yen (US$439,000),
allowing brokerages' trust-banking units to manage pension funds,
allowing brokerages to sell sophisticated financial products, allowing
banks' brokerage units to buy and sell stocks and permitting financial
institutions to be owned by holding companies."n The reforms should
liberalize the financial market, break down barriers and improve dis-
closure and fair-trading practices.l" While the details of each pro-
posal are not yet clear, at the core of each is the removal of the MOF
and the government in general from the business of regulating mar-
kets. 24
A. Compared to London
The goal of these changes is to accomplish what the LSE was
able to do in 1986, namely to remain competitive in the international
securities market. Thus, like the LSE, the Japanese market will
abolish fixed commissions in 1999. The hope is that negotiated com-
missions will improve the quality of services and promote competi-
tion '2 In London, the move to negotiated commissions benefited in-
stitutional investors and harmed smaller, individual investors.
26
However, the discrepancy in benefits was the LSE failure to reduce
costs associated with clearing and settling transactions.
127
Like the pre-Big Bang LSE, Japan currently has a single-capacity
system. The Big Bang would allow banks' brokerage units to buy and
sell stocks as well as underwrite a wider variety of bonds. Currently,
they can only trade and underwrite some types of bonds.' In addi-
tion, similar to British reforms, Tokyo will open up membership to its
market. Until now, Japan has not permitted holding companies for
financial institutions. As it did in London, this has inhibited the abil-
ity to use capital in ways that could repair Japan's economy. An in-
121. Japan Banking on Change, supra note 7.
122. Id.
123. Japan Approves Part of 'Big Bang' Plan, WALL ST. J. (Asia), June 8, 1998, at
5.
124. See Hanson, supra note 49.
125. Ministry of Finance, supra note 5.
126. See POSER, supra note 63, at 55.
127. See id.
128. See Japan Banking on the Change, supra note 7.
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flux of capital will benefit the domestic as well as international mar-
kets.
Domestic consumers also benefit from opening up the manage-
ment of pension funds because it will increase competition. Broker-
ages will be able to compete with banks by offering accounts where
customers can deposit paychecks and pay bills.' The desired result
in the market will be efficiency and profitability. Furthermore, as in
other countries, Japan is seeing an institutionalization of its market."
Thus, making things easier and more profitable for pension funds is
an important goal, especially given Japan's aging society.' Increased
competition will lower costs and make transactions more efficient as
managers move to increase business and profits. The goal of all these
reforms, as was the goal in the British Big Bang, is to revitalize the
market and boost competitiveness. For this to happen, it is necessary
for Japan to establish a free trading environment to match those of
the United States and Europe.m
B. Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law
Improving efficiency and lowering costs to investors are the
goals of the first set of reforms, a series of amendments to the For-
eign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law. The substantial
changes made by the Diet took effect in April 1998.'" The reforms
allow Japanese companies and individuals to open overseas bank ac-
counts and settle payments for trades in foreign financial markets
freely.' In the past, companies and individuals had to go through
registered banks to ship money overseas."' Shipping included open-
ing deposit accounts with overseas financial institutions to settle ex-
port and import payments, making loans, investments and debt guar-
antees, netting foreign-currency-denominated claims and obligations,
trading foreign currencies and making foreign-currency futures con-
tracts." With a monopoly, those registered banks charged excessive
129. Id. For a more comprehensive review of specific Big Bang reforms, see Ja-
pan's Financial Market Big Bang: The First Shock Waves (pt. 2), Bus. ASIA, June 12,
1998, available in 1998 WL 9332278; Regulatory Watcldist in Japan, JEI REP., Sept. 8,
1997, available in 1997 WL 20S16212.
130. Honda, supra note 42.
131. Id.
132. Panel Eyes Full Deregulation of Forer Services, supra note 2.
133. Revision of Foreign Exchange Law Wins Diet Approval, supra note 8.
134. Japan Banking on the Change, supra note 7, at B6.
135. Id.
136. Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Amendment of the Foreign Er-
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fees. The changes to the FEFTL completely liberalize all foreign ex-
change control regulations.'" In fact, one of the symbolic changes in
the law is the removal of the word "control" from its title. 13
The three principal elements of the amendments are: liberaliza-
tion of domestic and cross-border foreign exchange transactions,
complete liberalization of foreign exchange business and establish-
ment of an ex-post facto reporting system.39 These changes abolish
the system of prior permission and notification for foreign exchange
transactions not conducted through authorized foreign exchange
banks, which made it more burdensome to deal in foreign currency
outside of the few government registered banks.4' The prior permis-
sion and notification systems are replaced with a less invasive retro-
active system. Specifically, the amendments state that foreign ex-
change banks and money exchangers no longer need permission from
authorities for foreign exchange transactions, thus abolishing the
designated securities firm system."'
Liberalization is also accomplished by the abolition of the fixed
foreign exchange rate system. It is replaced with the instruction that
authorities make efforts to stabilize the exchange rate by buying or
selling the means of payment.4 Reform of the foreign exchange sys-
tem should help to reduce the cost of overseas business and maintain
international competitiveness. At the same, it should increase the
number of financial transactions thus contributing to the quality,
quantity and sophistication of the market.'43
C. Re-Regulation
As mentioned earlier, while the Big Bang is noted for its de-
change and Foreign Trade Control Law (last modified May 1997)
<http:/www.miti.go.jp/report-e/g3l4OOle.html> [hereinafter MITI Report on
FEFTCL Amendments].
137. But see Andrew Horvat, Japan Investors Tread Warily: Deregulation Hasn't
Encouraged the Transfer of Funds Overseas, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 27, 1998, at
22.
138. Gaikoku Kawase Oyobi Gaikoku Boeki Ho [Foreign Exchange and Foreign
Trade Law], Law No. 228 of 1949 (as amended) [hereinafter FEFTL]. For an Eng-
lish version, see Overview of the Amendment of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign
Trade Control Law (visited Feb. 1, 1998) <http:llwww.mof.go.jp/english/big-
bang/ebb26.htm>.
139. MITI Report on FEFTCL Amendments, supra note 136.
140. Id.
141. FEFTL art. 10.
142. FEFTL art. 7.
143. MITI Report on FEFTCL Amendments, supra note 136.
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regulation, re-regulation often occurs simultaneously.'" However, re-
regulation in the face of deregulation or liberalization may be justi-
fied as long as the new regulations are meant to improve the condi-
tions for competition. ' Under the new FEFTL, the Japanese gov-
ernment still requires prior notification for people who intend to
export or import the means of payment. "' In addition, prior notifica-
tion is also required on foreign direct investment in certain indus-
tries." These industries include leather goods production and weap-
ons manufacturing.1" Banking and textile production are among the
industries that were de-listed by the amendments." '
Even if prior notification is required, however, the government
promised that a request or order to suspend or modify the proposed
foreign direct investment would be limited. The amendments fur-
ther simplified reporting information to focus on essentials like data
for balancing payments statistics and information that contributes to
the accurate monitoring of market trends.' In chapter 6 of the
FEFTL law, the amendments develop an ex-post facto reporting sys-
tem. Furthermore, the more limited prior notification system for
protected industries only requires reports of the following: payments,
identification by banks and other financial institutions, capital trans-
actions, direct investment in Japan, importation of technology and
foreign exchange business.f
D. Effects
These reforms will facilitate the flow of money to the market,
maximizing returns and minimizing costs to market participants.
This does not mean that the Japanese markets will prosper. If the
current fee and tax structures are maintained, at least some trading
144. See VOGEL, supra note 3.
145. Id. at 17.
146. FEFTL, Law No. 228 of 1949, art. 18 (as amended); see Horvat, supra note
137.
147. FEFTL art. 26.
148. Tomomitsu Oba, Ramifications of Foreign-Exchange Dccontrol, JAPAN
EcHo, Aug. 1997, at 3.
149. Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Overhaul Set for Foreign Exchange Laiv: Steam
Building for Japan's Financial Big Bang (visited Feb. 1, 1993)
<http://www.infoweb.or.jpfdkbrmfoecon!970619706-3e.html>.
150. FEFTL arts. 26-31.
151. Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, supra note 149.
152. FEF1L arts. 26-31.
153. Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, supra note 149.
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will shift to foreign markets where fees and taxes are lower.' " For
example, under the amendments, a Japanese citizen can open an
overseas account to pay for mail-order purchases or purchase stock 55
An investor in Japan would find it beneficial to do the, r buying and
selling overseas, even for Japanese stocks, if the commissions on
stock transactions are lower."6 Therefore, other reforms must follow
the opening up of the foreign currency market in order to prevent the
rapid outflow of yen to overseas markets.
Some shift in the amount of holdings abroad and domestically is
expected as investors attempt to maximize their options in the mar-
ket's freer atmosphere. In fact, since the implementation of the
FEFTL measures, Japanese individuals and institutions have moved
to place money in overseas dollar and other foreign..currency ac-
counts that have a much higher interest rate than domestic yen-
dominated accounts." In April 1998 alone, there was a net capital
outflow of 2.8 trillion yen (US$23.3 billion)."' However, this figure is
only a fraction of the estimated 1,200 trillion yen (US$10 trillion)
Japanese individuals have in various forms of savings accounts. 5'
The weakened state of the Japanese economy makes these savings a
flight risk as well. The likely effect of the combined changes in the
foreign exchange laws without corresponding changes elsewhere may
encourage Japanese investors to look to foreign financial markets for
better opportunities.
Specifically, if Japan does not abolish the transaction tax and
fixed commission system swiftly, the loosening of the foreign ex-
change laws will result in a loss of business to overseas firms. The re-
forms must also permit the development of a variety of financial
products to compete with international firms. As proposed, some of
these changes are part of the Big Bang.' However, they were not
implemented at the same time the changes to the Foreign Exchange
Law were. Until further changes are implemented, Japan will lose
154. Id.
155. Oba, supra note 148.
156. Id.
157. Neil A. Martin, Big Bang, Big Surprises, BARRON'S, May 25, 1998, at 18
(stating that a three-month yen time deposit pays a mere 0.25%-0.35% a year); Dai-
Ichi Kangyo Bank, supra note 149.
158. Tony Boyd, Japan Invests $36bn Overseas in First Month cf Deregulation,
AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REV., May 12, 1998, at 14.
159. Horvat, supra note 137; Japan Banking on Change, supra note 7, at B5.
160. See Jon Choy, Japan's Financial Market Big Bang: The First Shock Waves
(pt. 1), JEI REP., June 12,1998, available in 1998 WL 9332277.
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business to cheaper more diversified overseas business. The barriers
shielding Japanese financial markets from overseas rivals must fall,
and Tokyo's ability to survive in unfettered global competition
tested."1
The FEFTL changes are consistent with the free, fair and global
principles of Big Bang reform; it is the global principle that is specifi-
cally emphasized in the FEFTL changes. The liberalization of the
foreign currency and exchange system effects all cross-border capital
transactions, including bank deposits, securities and insurance. For
all of these transactions, the revision of the law brings Japan's cur-
rency conversion in line with international standards. As discussed
above, this does not mean immediate success for the Japanese finan-
cial market. After the protective barriers disappear, Japan will con-
tinue to lose in the international market if it does not conform to
global norms in other regulatory areas like tax and commission rates.
In order for the Japanese financial market to be internationally
attractive, it must be efficient and expandable, allowing free entry
and exit in the business activities of the participants' choice. The re-
vitalization of the Japanese market requires the authorized foreign
exchange bank system be removed allowing the free exchange of for-
eign currencies and derivative transactions, but it will also require
more." The amendments help revitalize the domestic market by the
total liberalization of capital transactions, abolishment of the system
of authorized foreign exchange banks and removal of the prior notifi-
cation restrictions from most industries. 3 Without complementary
reforms in other financial laws, the FEFTL amendments will simply
make it easier for domestic investment to move abroad, leaving Ja-
pan with the money but none of the other essentials of an interna-
tional financial center.' The Big Bang reforms should avoid this re-
sult for the benefit of Japan.
E. Will the FEFTL Reforms Be Successful?
Mindful of criticism that previous deregulation plans have come
too little too late, ministry officials insist that these changes are much
161. Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, supra note 149.
162. Ministry of Finance, Specific Issues for the Invigoration of the Tokyo Market
(visited Feb. 1, 1998) <http'J/www.mof.go.jp/english/ela702f3.html>.
163. Smaller Japanese Cos Cash in on Foreign-lExchange Easing, ASIA PULSE, July
28, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12625362.
164. Asahi Shimbun Interview, supra note 58.
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more than a gimmick.65 Regardless, the Japanese Big Bang will not
be taken seriously unless the various reforms originally outlined by
Hashimoto are approved and implemented without delay. This will
require continued government leadership support of the reforms,
which are certain to cause short-term pain. Eisuke Sakakibara, a
former vice-minister for Hashimoto and architect of the Big Bang re-
forms, believes that financial deregulation is necessary in this time of
globalization, but some social needs, like high employment, will not
be sacrificed to achieve financial goals.'" While the government con-
tinues to pass additional Big Bang reforms 67 under a new Prime
Minister, Keizo Obuchi, comments like those of Sakakibara raise
some concern by commentators that the government is not willing to
remove itself from its financial industries.'" In addition, there is real
concern that the high level of regulation makes Japan's industries less
able to compete in a globalized economy.69 If Japan is unable to
compete, it will be difficult to pay pensions, provide health care and
other social services to the aging population,' the same social needs
that Sakakibara says he will not sacrifice.
The success or failure of the FEFTL amendments is not neces-
sarily a forecast of the success or failure of other Big Bang reforms.
The FEFTL amendments are fairly uncontroversial; few companies
will be forced out of business because of them.'' Other reforms, like
the end of fixed commissions and the single-capacity system, will be
aggressively challenged by securities firms whose income will be re-
duced and competition increased by the planned reforms." These
changes will put many brokers out of business. While supporters of
165. Rowley, supra note 5.
166. Neil Weinberg, Japan Joins the World: 'Mr. Yen' Argues ThatJapan's Recov-
ery Is for Real and That Japanese Assets Are a Bargain, FORBES, Sept. 22, 1997, at 46.
167. Rowley, supra note 5.
168. Gillian Tett, Financial Socialism, Japanese Style, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov.
16, 1998, at C7; see Gregory Ruback, Comment, Master of Puppets: How Japan's
Ministry of Finance Orchestrates Its Own Reformation, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 185
(1998).
169. Barr, supra note 48.
170. Id. Japan is the world's "grayest" country with an estimated seventeen per-
cent of the population sixty-five years old or older by the year 2000. See Japan: Re-
view 1998, supra note 41. In fact, by 2025, one of every four Japanese is expected to
be over the age of sixty-five. See Hamilton, supra note 43.
171. A Big Bang for Japan: The Japanese Government Has Announced Its Inten-
tion to Reform the Financial System. Should Its Proposals Be Taken Seriously?,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11247412.
172. Id.; Richard Lloyd Parry, Vested Interests Could Hinder Japan's Move to
Open Markets, INDEP. (London), Nov. 13, 1996, at 19.
[Vol. 22:379
1999] Will the "Bang" Mean "Big" Changes to Japanese Financial Laws? 401
the Big Bang reforms say they are willing to let businesses fail in light
of the reforms, in reality, politicians may shy away from the proposed
complete liberalization of restrictions and instead go for a more con-
voluted solution in order to prevent business failures." Such alterna-
tives include allowing firms to enter markets previously excluded by
setting up a new business under the umbrella of a holding company. "4
The reforms to the FEFTL were implemented in April 1998.
The amendments should provide the impetus for the rest of the re-
forms only if those changes come swiftly. If they are hampered by
the political process and vested governmental interests, the strength
of the Japanese market-its high level of available capital-will fly
overseas to more investor-friendly markets. The bureaucrats, their
administrative guidance,17" business and the symbiotic relationship
between business and Diet Members'm must not be allowed to de-
stroy the Big Bang. There will be pains in the beginning, but if Japan
is to remain an international finance center, it must follow the liber-
alization of the foreign exchange and currency markets with other
important deregulation measures.
1. Structural Impediments to Reform
a. Administrative Guidance (Gyosei Shido)
Administrative guidance 77 is a common Japanese regulatory
technique that, although generally non-binding, seeks to conform the
behavior of regulated parties to broad administrative goals.1 ' It is
commonly used to describe a "category of informal regulation of pri-
vate industry that is widespread in Japan."'' To most observers, it is
bureaucratically driven, informal and part of a "carefully orches-
trated industrial policy."" To others, "[i]n reality, law is an empty
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See discussion infra Part IV.D.I.a.
176. See Barr, supra note 48; Parry, supra note 172.
177. There are five forms of administrative guidance: shiji (directives), yobo (re-
quests), keikoku (warnings), konkoku (suggestions) and kansha (encouragements).
Paul Lansing & Marlene Wechselblatt, Doing Business in Japan: The Importance of
the Unwritten Law, 17 INT'L LAW. 647, 658 (1983).
178. Michael K. Young, Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance. Govern-
mentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLI-.I. L. REv.
923,930 (1984).
179. See Hurst, supra note 47, at 392.
180. YUKIO YANAGIDA ET AL.., LAW AND INVESTMENT IN JAPAN: CASES AND
MATERALS 125 (1994).
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shell; it is . . . administrative guidance that [has] practical signifi-
cance."
18'
Under the recently adopted Administrative Procedures Act,
administrative guidance received its first legal recognition. While the
Act does not pass judgment on the legality of such guidance, it reiter-
ates the fundamental principles derived from the Japanese concept of
"rule of law" as an admonishment, and it provides for some proce-
dural mechanisms to minimize the risk of abuse by administrative
bodies." Whether the Act's general provisions will have a specific
impact on the role of administrative guidance in Japanese policy
making is questionable, and the new liberalizations run the risk of
being overcome by the strength of administrative guidance."f
If administrative guidance is allowed to continue under the Big
Bang, the changes will have little impact on the economy because
foreigners still will be forced into the less advantageous position in
any investment scheme through administrative guidance. As long as
government is allowed to protect industry through informal measures
and domestic business can rely on ties to bureaucrats to overcome
foreign investors, the Big Bang reforms and the Japanese economy
will suffer. More than anything else, administrative guidance has the
ability to undermine the Big Bang.
b. Keiretsu System
The keiretsu represent strong, interlinked business group rela-
tionships. There are six large horizontally-integrated and numerous
other vertically-integrated corporate or distribution keiretsu." Com-
panies within a keiretsu are bound together by mutual directors, ex-
tensive stock cross-holdings, group-wide financing through one main
affiliate bank and other long-term business relationships. ' Three of
181. Curtis J. Mlhaupt, Managing the Market: The Ministry of Fiaance and Secu-
rities Regulation in Japan, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 423, 460 (1994) (citing -Dokusen' Oku-
rasho Kenryoku no Kaitai [The Breakup of the Ministry of Finance's 'Monopoly'
Power], SHUKAN Toyo KEIZAi, Sept. 14,1991, at 10).
182. Lorenz Kdderitzsch, Japan's New Administrative Procedure Law: Reasons
for Its Enactment and Likely Implications, 24 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 105, 110
(1991). Traditionally, Japanese courts considered challenges to administrative guid-
ance to be non-justiciable. See Young, supra note 179.
183. See Jeffrey N. Lavine, Note, Foreign Investment in Japan: Understanding the
Japanese System and Its Cultural Barriers to Entry, 9 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1,19, 162 (1991).
184. YANAGIDA ET AL., supra note 180, at 1-11 (citing A.T. Kearney, Int'l, Inc.,
Trade and Investment in Japan: The Current Environment, June 1991, at 13-23).
185. See id.; see also Frank A. Weil & Norman D. Glick, Japan--Is the Market
Open? A View of the Japanese Market Drawn from U.S. Corporate Experience, 11
[Vol. 22:379
1999] Will the "Bang" Mean "Big" Changes to Japanese Financial Laws? 403
the six major keiretsu have roots in old zaibatsu, large commercial
and industrial combines outlawed during the U.S. Occupation.'
The level of cross-shareholding has the potential for effecting the
success or failure of the Big Bang. Cross-shareholding creates a lack
of transparency and speculation in shares. It allows Japanese compa-
nies in a keiretsu to create their own mini-markets; the bank at the
center of the keiretsu approves the financing for projects, the neces-
sary materials are bought within the group and the product is sold
within the group. This system leaves little need for maximizing prof-
its, and that is contrary to market forces and the Big Bang reforms
generally."l
The current recession, however, demonstrates that cross-
shareholding can only be successful if the economy is doing well.
Since the recession began in the early 1990s, the percentage of mutu-
ally held shares listed on Japan's stock exchanges has dropped .5 per-
cent every year.' Keiretsu companies are selling their shares because
the prolonged recession is forcing many companies to raise cash
quickly, and the slumping stock market diminishes the attraction of
buying and holding unprofitable shares."
Cross-shareholding became an institution in Japanese business
during the 1970s in response to the Japanese fear that foreigners
would try to come into the Japanese market and dominate it through
buying stock. The Big Bang reforms will make cross-shareholding
less attractive because competition will increase, requiring cost cut-
ting measures. Since cross-shareholding reduces available capital, it
is not a good investment, especially when the need for capital arises.
If foreigners are truly allowed into the Japanese market through Big
Bang deregulation, Japanese companies will have to sell their sister
holdings to compete in the new market. It is highly unlikely that an
attempt by the keiretsu to stay together and successfully block the en-
try of foreigners into the market would be successful. If that is cor-
rect, then a true liberalization of the market will force large Japanese
companies to rethink some of the basic ways they do business. How-
ever, if permitted to remain a major force in the Japanese financial
LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 845 (1979).
186. The three are Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo. YANAGIDA ET AL, sttpra
note 180, at 83.
187. See IWAO NAKATANI, THE JAPANESE FiRM IN TRANSTION 45-53 (1988).
188. Hiroyuki Nishimura, Recession Forces Firms to Dump Shares of Allies: Cross
Shareholding Erosion 'Irreversible', NIHON KEIzAi SHiIBMUN, May 2, 1994, at 1.
189. Id.
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market, the keiretsu's lack of transparency and speculation of shares
will prevent Japan's achievement of Big Bang goals."'
2. Social Impediments to Reform: Disdain of Foreigners
Cultural barriers also may effect the success of the Big Bang re-
forms. The cultural and other non-legal considerations are as impor-
tant to consider as the structural impediments because it is expected
that opening up the Japanese market will increase the number of for-
eign firms investing in Japan. 9' Thus, before the market opens in
practice, Japanese attitudes towards foreigners must change. The
Japanese do not see themselves as competing with each other. Their
goals have been to focus efforts on gaining market share and adver-
sarial trading on a national basis in export markets."n The Japanese
are known for their nationalism, and a series of reforms that open the
domestic financial market to international business will threaten cul-
tural norms and test the limits of cultural attitudes." It will not be
easy for Japanese companies to follow the United States and Britain
by adopting Anglo-Saxon market mechanisms and inviting foreigners
over for takeovers and acquisitions.94 Foreign investors should not
expect to be welcomed with open arms into the Japanese market any
time soon regardless of the liberalizations in the law.
V. Conclusion
Before anything else can be said, one must realize that any real
change that will happen must be measured in decades, not years."' It
would be overly optimistic to think that the Big Bang would produce
an immediate revitalization of the Japanese economy."" While there
appears to be a solid backing by the Prime Minister and his govern-
ment to the series of reforms that make up the Big Bang, there will
be considerable opposition to any serious change. The existing legal
obstacles to foreign investment were put in place to avoid foreign
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ceal the need for investor protection and market oversight).
191. Patrikis, supra note 28, at 588.
192. Dan F. Henderson, Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers in Japan, 39 ST.
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control; however, the key to future growth lies in structural reform of
the public and private sectors of the economy that increases the level
of available capital. If the results of Japan's Big Bang are anything
like those in London, much of that capital will come from foreign in-
vestors. If that happens, then the amount of foreign control vill in-
crease at the expense of less competitive domestic companies. In a
market-driven economy, those that do it the fastest and cheapest suc-
ceed. Japanese companies are not known for their efficiency and will
have to make radical changes in the way business is done if they ex-
pect to compete openly with foreign companies.
The immediate changes brought about by the amendments to
the FEFTL will accelerate the need for further reforms to make
Japanese companies more competitive with foreign firms. Without
further Big Bang measures, the amendments will create a flight of
Japanese capital to overseas markets, taking with it the strength of
the Japanese market. The time has come for Japan to realize its
closed system with excessive regulation and governmental interfer-
ence is incompatible with today's global market. If Japan truly is to
recover from its prolonged recession and regain its title as a top in-
ternational market, it will have to implement the Big Bang reforms
by the 2001 deadline or face being hampered by another set of pro-
longed, posed and ineffective reforms."
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1999, at C12 (stating that the Nikkei 225 index of leading Japanese shares has gained
25% for the year as compared to a pan European measure of major companies,
which is only up 5% year-to-date).

